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warned	 against	 the	 hidden	 dangers	 of	 credit	 default	 swaps	 (CDS).1	
Although	CDSs	can	be	a	useful	financial	 instrument	 for	 the	banking	
industry,	2	 the	article	warned	of	 the	anonymity	of	credit	derivatives,3	
*	 J.D.,	American	 University	 Washington	 College	 of	 Law,	 2010;	 B.A.	 in	 Economics,	 College	 of	
William	and	Mary.		I	would	like	to	thank	Professor	Anderson	for	all	his	help	in	developing	my	
topic.		
1	 See generally	Jules	Stewart,	Hidden Dangers of Credit Swaps, Banker,	Dec.	2000,	at	74	(outlining	
the	dangers	of	the	reliance	on	CDSs).
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lack	of	transparency,4	and	the	potential	for	disaster.5	In	an	unfortunately	
accurate	 conclusion,	 the	 journalist	 opined	 that	 a	 crisis	 might	 occur	































8	 Jerome	A.	Madden,	A Weapon of Mass Destruction Strikes: Credit Default Swaps Bring Down AIG 
and Lehman Brothers,	8	Am. U. Bus. L. Brief	15,	15	(2008)	(chronicling	the	financial	crisis	through	
AIG	and	actions	from	regulators).	





11	 Alex	Blumberg,	Unregulated Credit Default Swaps Led to Weakness,	NPR	(Oct.	31,	2008),	http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId	=96395271.
12	 René	 M.	 Stulz,	 Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis	 7	 (European	 Corporate	 Governance	





13	 See e.g.,	Anupan	Chander	&	Randall	Costa,	Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A Case Study in Global 
Legal Convergence,	10	Chi. J. Int’l L.	639,	649–50	(“AIG	and	Lehman,	both	highly	regulated,	capi-
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a. What are CredIt default SWaPS?
CDSs	 are	 financial	 instruments	 that	 create	 an	 exchange	 of	 pay-
ments	based	on	 the	credit	performance	of	an	underlying	asset.16	The	

















18	 Viral	 V.	 Acharya,	 Robert	 F.	 Engle,	 Stephen	 Figlewski,	 Anthony	 W.	 Lynch	 &	 Marti	 G.	
Subrahmanyam, Centralized Clearing for Credit Derivatives,	 in Restoring Financial Stability: 
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stream	of	payments	necessary	to	keep	the	contract	 in	 force,	until	 the	
contract	expires.
The	best	example	of	the	incentives	behind	CDSs	is	a	bank	lending	
to	a	 large	 corporation.19	Although	 the	bank	 is	well	 aware	of	 the	 risk	
they	have	taken	and	have	considered	the	risk	in	their	interest	rate,	the	
corporation	may	want	more	money	and	the	bank	may	not	be	willing	
































23	 See	 Sherri	 Venokur,	 Matthew	 Magidson	 &	Adam	 M.	 Singer,	 Comparing Credit Default Swaps 
or Insurance Contracts: Did the New York State Insurance Department Get it Right?,	 28	Futures & 
Derivatives L. Rep.	1,	3	(2008).
24	 See Partnoy	&	Skeel, supra	note	16,	at	1022–24.	
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Similar	 to	 clearinghouses,	dealers	act	as	 the	 intermediary	 for	 the	
many	 end-users	 that	 contract	 with	 the	 dealer	 and	 then	 hedge	 their	
exposure	 to	 each	 contract	 by	 offsetting	 the	 trade.31	 However,	 these	
dealers	do	not	impose	any	of	the	rules	that	established	clearinghouses	
enforce.32	Prior	 to	 the	economic	meltdown,	 the	 largest	dealers	 in	 the	






End-users	 can	 include	 large	and	 small	 corporations	or	any	other	






28	 Michael	Kent,	OTC Derivative Regulation – the Benefits of Clearing,	30	Futures & Derivatives L. 
Rep.	13,	14	(2010)	(“OTC	markets	have	traditionally	not	involved	clearing,	as	the	products	have	
included	non-standardized	contracts	which	could	not	be	traded	on	exchange.”).
29	 See Partnoy	&	Skeel,	supra	note	16,	at	1021	(“[A]	credit	default	swap	is	a	private	contract	 in	
which	private	parties	bet	on	a	debt	issuer’s	bankruptcy,	default,	or	restructuring.”).	






32	 See generally	Christian	Johnson,	The Enigma of Clearing: Buy Side OTC Derivatives,	29	Futures 
& Derivatives L. Rep.	 1,	 7	 (Dec.	 2009)	 [hereinafter	 Enigma of Clearing]	 (explaining	 that	 due	 to	
the	new	regulations	 requiring	OTC	derivatives	 to	be	cleared,	 clearinghouses	will	have	 to	“de-
velop	backoffices	and	processes	 that	banks	and	other	dealers	have	spent	years	cultivating	and	
refining.”).	
33	 OTC Derivatives Documentation,	supra	note	29,	at	4–5	(“The	largest	dealers	in	the	OTC	mar-
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movements.37	 Speculators	 can	 include	 hedge	 funds,	 financial	 institu-
tions,	dealers,	or	end-users.38
C. What are CDS ContraCtS?











tract	 allows	 market	 participants	 to	 minimize	 the	 basis	 or	 correlation	
risk,	which	is	the	risk	that	the	product	does	not	match	the	underlying	
risk	to	be	hedged.	The	benefit	of	a	clearinghouse	lies	in	the	economies	
of	scale,	 in	 that	 the	clearinghouses	provide	greater	 liquidity	by	stan-
dardizing	contracts.42
Part II
a. In WIth the neW, out WIth the olD; CDS tranSItIon from  












41	 See generally	Ward	Bortz	&	Jeffrey	A.	Rosenberg,	The Big Bang: A Guide to the Standardized CDS 
Contract,	29	Futures & Derivatives L. Rep.	10	(May	2009)	(discussing	the	various	contract	pro-
visions,	 which	 are	 amendments	 to	 the	 CDS	 contract,	 enacted	 through	 an	 ISDA	 protocol	 and	
supplement).
42	 Sharon	Brown-Hruska,	The Derivatives Marketplace: Exchanges and the Over-the-Counter Market, 
Financial Derivatives 23 (Robert	W.	Kolb	&	James	A.	Overdahl	eds.,	2010).	
43	 7	U.S.C.	§	1.	
44	 Commodity	Futures	Modernization	Act	of	2000,	Pub.	L.	No.	106-554,	§	303,	114	Stat.	2763	(2000).	
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an	 agreement,	 contract,	 or	 transaction	 in	 connection	
with	the	conduct	of	the	entity’s	business	or	to	manage	
the	 risk	associated	with	an	asset	or	 liability	owned	or	





Furthermore,	 there	 is	 no	 requirement	 that	 CDSs	 be	 traded	 on	
exchanges	 or	 clearinghouses,	 and	 there	 are	 no	 regulations	 regarding	
how	much	collateral	should	be	posted	in	each	CDS	contract.	The	Dodd-
Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act	(Dodd-Frank	
Act)51	 drastically	 changed	 the	 regulatory	 regime	 of	 CDSs,	 beginning	
with	bringing	the	financial	instruments	under	the	regulatory	purview	
of	both	the	CFTC	and	the	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission	(SEC).











49	 OTC Derivatives Documentation,	supra	note	30,	at	95.	
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B. Congressional DeBate surrounDing the DoDD-Frank aCt  



















to	 define	 “major	 swap	 participant”	 to	 encompass	 those	 entities	 that	
were	actively	engaged	in	the	swap	markets	but	to	allow	end-users	an	
exemption,	 so	 that	 end-users	 would	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 collateral	 and	
margin	requirements.	However,	this	issue	was	fought	on	two	occasions	
in	the	House,	in	first	passing	H.R.	4173	and	then	again	during	the	rec-
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exemption	 for	end-users	but	 require	end-users	 to	 report	 the	 transac-
tion	on	an	exchange,	were	also	voted	down	to	provide	end-users	with	
added	protection.60	While	in	both	cases,	the	amendments	were	geared	























60	 H.R. Rep. No.	111–370,	at	11	(2009).
61	 See supra notes	62-66.	
62	 See	156	Cong. Rec. H5,227	(daily	ed.	June	30,	2010)	(statement	of	Rep.	Garrett)	(“Unfortunately,	
not	a	single	Democrat	supported	that	House	language	in	the	final	vote,	despite	the	fact	that	very	
same	language	was	originally	sponsored	by	the	.	.	.	chairman.”).
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A. The Problems in The mArkeT And The PoTenTiAl soluTions
However,	 the	market	 is	not	without	 serious	problems.	The	prob-
lems	include	systemic	risk,	limited	disclosures,	and	incentives	against	
monitoring.	 Due	 to	 the	 opacity	 of	 the	 credit	 default	 market	 and	 the	
limited	disclosures,	 it	 is	unclear	what	the	contractual	agreements	are	
and	who	actually	holds	what	positions.73	This	issue	further	exacerbated	




















74	 See	 Viral	 V.	 Acharya,	 Robert	 F.	 Engle,	 Stephen	 Figlewski,	 Anthony	 W.	 Lynch	 &	 Marti	 G.	
Subrahmanyam, Centralized Clearing for Credit Derivatives,	 in Restoring Financial Stability: 





76	 René	 M.	 Stulz,	 Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis	 7	 (European	 Corporate	 Governance	
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ing,	and	limited	disclosures)	reflect	the	overlying	problems	within	the	
CDS	 markets.	 Specifically,	 regulators	 have	 honed	 in	 on	 the	 counter-
party	and	operation	risk	and	the	lack	of	transparency	for	allowing	sys-
temic	risk	exposures	to	grow	without	being	noticed.
B. Will the ProPosed legislation solve these ProBlems?
Integral	 to	 the	 proposed	 legislation	 is	 shifting	 over-the-counter	
derivatives	to	clearinghouses.79	As	with	any	policy	decision,	there	are	
advantages	and	disadvantages.	Clearinghouses	are	beneficial	because	
the	 clearinghouse	 achieves	 both	 risk-reduction	 and	 risk-spreading.80	
The	 clearinghouse	 achieves	 a	 degree	 of	 risk-spreading	 by	 interpos-
ing	 itself	 between	 all	 the	 clearing	 members	 and	 becoming	 the	 coun-
terparty	 to	 every	 transaction.81	 The	 clearinghouse	 sets	 the	 collateral	
requirements	to	daily	reflect	the	contracts	assumed	by	the	traders	and	
the	changes	in	value	of	the	position,	which	is	referred	to	as	“mark-to-
market.”	 Moreover,	 the	 clearinghouse	 is	 able	 to	 reduce	 risk	 through	
“netting”	 contracts.82	 Netting	 is	 a	 strategy	 that	 offsets	 matching	 and	
opposing	trades	to	minimize	the	risks	associated	with	settlement.83





put	 over-the-counter	 derivatives	 on	 clearinghouses	 if	 the	 clearing-
houses	accept	those	derivatives,	and	the	CFTC/SEC	states	that	those	
derivatives	need	 to	be	cleared.86	While	 the	end-user	exemption	 from	
79	 See Enigma of Clearing,	supra	note	32,	at	4	(“The	recently	passed	House	Bill	and	the	proposed	
Senate	Finance	Committee	bill	each	impose	clearing	requirements	on	OTC	derivatives.”).	
80	 Richard	Dale,	Risk Management in U.S. Derivatives Clearing Houses,	14	Essays in International 
Financial & Economic Law 8 (1998). 
81	 Id.
82	 Alex	Blumberg,	Unregulated Credit Default Swaps Led to Weakness,	NPR	(Oct.	31,	2008),	http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=	96395271.	
83	 Sharon	Brown-Hruska,	The Derivatives Marketplace: Exchanges and the Over-the-Counter Market,	
Financial Derivatives 31 (Robert	W.	Kolb	&	James	A.	Overdahl	eds.,	2010).
84	 See, e.g.,	 Jonathan	 D.	 Gupta,	 Modernizing the Infrastructure for OTC Derivatives: CDS Central 
Counterparties and Other Industry Initiatives to Address Systemic, Counterparty and Operational Risks 





on	 a	 Global	 Basis	 (Mar.	 9,	 2010),	 available at http://ir.theice.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=	
450426.
86	 See	discussion	supra	Part	II.	
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over-the-counter	 derivatives	 problem.	 While	 a	 substantial	 amount	































91	 See	 id.	 (“[T]hese	 critical	 risk	management	 functions	prevent	 small	 losses	 from	accumulating	
unnoticed.”).	
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Part IV
a. GoVernance
There	 are	 multiple	 benefits	 to	 the	 clearing	 system;	 however,	 the	
question	that	still	lingers	is	whether	clearing	CDS	contracts	will	solve	
the	problems	that	plagued	corporations	like	AIG.93	Implicit	in	the	gov-



















93	 See generally id. (questioning	whether	clearing	CDS	contracts	will	make	the	system	more	risk	
adverse). 
94	 See	Houman	B.	Shadab,	Counterparty Regulation and Its Limits: The Evolution of the Credit Default 






96	 See generally	Paul	Ali,	Corporate Governance and Derivatives End Users,	in	Practical Derivatives: 
A Transactional Approach 9,	11	(Jonathan	Denton	ed.,	2006)	(outlining	the	duty	of	care	expect-
ed	from	corporate	governance).
97	 See generally	Calcina	Howson,	When “Good” Corporate Governance Makes “Bad” (Financial) Firms: 
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B. The Clearing of CDSS iS an imperfeCT SoluTion.
While	 the	 clearing	of	CDSs	will	 add	 transparency	 to	 the	market,	
there	are	still	lingering	questions	regarding	whether	the	proposed	leg-
islation	 may	 create	 problems	 and	 potential	 loopholes.	 The	 ongoing	
debate	over	 the	exemption	 for	end-users	 is	particularly	noticeable.100	
The	benefit	 for	 this	exemption	 is	 that	companies	or	 individuals	who	
have	exposure	to	the	direct	asset	can	tailor	their	particular	CDS	con-
tracts	 to	 the	 asset’s	 risk.101	 However,	 there	 is	 also	 the	 fear	 that	 this	
exemption	 will	 become	 a	 loophole	 within	 the	 legislation102	 or,	 in	 the	
alternative,	it	will	unnecessarily	restrict	market	actors.	While	this	issue	





For	 CDS	 contracts,	 the	 market	 is	 already	 strongly	 standardized	 and	
moving	the	contracts	through	clearinghouses	will	add	to	the	transpar-
ency	 and	 security	 of	 the	 market.	 Through	 clearinghouses,	 the	 CFTC	

















102	Gary	 Gensler,	 Chairman,	 Commodity	 Futures	 Trading	 Comm.,	 OTC	 Derivatives	 Reform,	
Atlantic Council	(Jan.	12,	2010)	(asserting	that	the	Wall	Street	banks	benefit	from	the	end-user	
exemption	rather	than	the	businesses	using	the	derivatives).
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